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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shernor A. Williams appeals from the district court's decision affirming the
magistrate's judgment of conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Williams
guilty of misdemeanor driving without privileges.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On February 15, 2013 Officer Bateman, while driving on Overland Road,
observed the male driver of a gray 2004 Volkswagen Jetta continually glancing at
Officer Bateman in the review mirror. (7/25/13 Tr. p. 4, L. 23 - p. 6, L. 18.) The
Jetta was driving in the right lane and Officer Bateman was in the left lane.
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 2-10.)
Officer Bateman ran the license plate through a records check. (7/25/13
Tr., p. 6, L. 19 - p. 7, L. 4.) The records check revealed the owner of the Jetta
was Shernor A. Williams ("Williams"). (Id.) The records check showed Williams'
driving privileges were suspended.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 12, L. 9.)

Officer Bateman pulled up a photo of Williams on the computer mounted directly
in front of him. (Id.)
Officer Bateman then drove up next to the Jetta and looked at its male
driver. (7 /25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 12, L. 9.) The driver then looked at Officer
Bateman.

(Id.)

Officer Bateman drove next to the Jetta until he was able to

confirm that it was Williams. (Id., see also Tr., p. 13, L. 6-13.) During this time,
Officer Bateman had a clear view of Williams driving the Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p.
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12, Ls. 10-18.) Officer Bateman's passenger window was down and William's
driver's side window was clear. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 19, L. 12 - p. 20, L. 20.) It took
Officer Bateman roughly six to seven seconds to confirm that the driver of the
Jetta was Williams. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12-p. 12, L. 9.)
When Officer Bateman began to slow down to get behind Williams,
Williams slowed down at the same speed, preventing Officer Bateman from
getting behind him.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 13, L. 6 - p. 14, L. 6.)

Officer Bateman

slowed down to 20 mph, but Williams continued to slow down at the same rate.
(Id.) Officer Bateman explained:
It was obvious to me he didn't want me to get behind him.
Wouldn't look over at me. I could see out of the corner of his eye,
kind of, looking to see the position of my vehicle was. Without
stopping in the roadway I wasn't going to be able to get behind his
car.
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 1-6.) Williams and Officer Bateman slowed down almost
to a stop. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 4-8.)
Williams then made a quick right turn into the Sagecrest Apartments, and
Officer Bateman was unable to safely follow him. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-17.)
Officer Bateman continued to the next turn and tried to find Williams, but he was
unsuccessful. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 14, L. 18- p. 15, L. 4.)
Officer Bateman then attempted to find Williams at the address listed on
his motor vehicle report.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 15, L. 15 - p. 16, L. 13; Ex. 1.)

However, Williams no longer lived at that address. (Id.) The apartment manager
provided Officer Bateman with Williams' cell phone number and Officer Bateman
called Williams the next day. (Id.)
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When Officer Bateman asked Williams whether he had been driving the
day before, Williams paused for a long time then said he did not remember.
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 18-25.) Officer Bateman arranged to meet Williams at
Idaho State Police Headquarters parking lot that same day. (7 /25/13 Tr., p. 16,
L. 3 - p. 17, L. 25.)

When they met at the parking lot, Officer Bateman again confirmed that
Williams was the same person who he saw driving the gray 2004 Volkswagen
Jetta the day before.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 16, L. 3 - p. 17, L. 25.)

During their

conversation, Williams admitted that his license had been suspended but he
thought it was taken care of.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 1-17.)

Williams was

charged with Driving without Privileges. (R., p. 5.)
Officer Bateman and Dorrine O'Neil, a records keeper from the Idaho
Transportation Department, testified at trial.

Ms. O'Neil testified that Williams'

driver's license was suspended on February 15, 2013. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 25, L. 15
- p. 26, L. 24.) The state also introduced the Idaho Transportation Department
Motor Vehicle record report which showed Williams as the owner of the gray
2004 Volkswagen Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 9, L. 24 - p. 10, L. 3; Ex. 1.)
Williams testified in his own defense and denied that he was driving on
February 15, 2013.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 30, Ls. 19-23.) Williams admitted that he

owned a gray 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 19-21.)
Williams admitted that his license suspension went into effect on December 14,
2012. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 22-25.)
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The jury found Williams guilty of Driving Without Privileges. (R., p. 42.)
Williams appealed his conviction to the district court. (R., pp. 71-73.) The district
court affirmed Williams' conviction for Driving Without Privileges. (R., pp. 138145.) It first found that Williams had not objected to the introduction of Officer
Bateman's identification of Williams and failed to argue that this identification
constituted fundamental error on intermediate appeal. (R., pp. 141-142.) The
district court also determined there was sufficient evidence to find that Williams
was driving the 2004 Volkswagen Jetta. (R., pp. 142-143.) Finally, the district
court rejected Williams' argument that there was insufficient evidence that he
knew his license was suspended. (R., p. 143.) Williams filed a timely appeal
from the decision of the district court affirming the jury verdict in the magistrate
court. (R., pp. 146-148.)
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ISSUES

Williams states the issues on appeal as:
Whether permitting Officer Bateman to identify Mr. Williams in court
and testify to his out-of-court identification constitutes a
fundamental error?
Whether the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to establish the
identity of the driver observed by Officer Bateman on February 15,
2013?
Whether the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to establish that
Mr. Williams had knowledge of his license suspension in effect on
February 15, 2013?
(Appellant's brief, p. 2.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Williams failed to show fundamental error entitling him to appellate
review of his unpreserved claim that Officer Bateman's identification of Williams
violated his due process rights?
2.
Has Williams failed to show the district court erred in concluding there was
sufficient evidence to support Williams conviction for misdemeanor driving
without privileges?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Williams Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error Entitling Him To
Appellate Review Of His Unpreserved Claim Of A Due Process Violation

A.

Introduction
Officer Bateman testified that he drove next to a 2004 gray Volkswagen

Jetta until he confirmed the driver was Williams. (7 /25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p.
12, L. 9.)

At trial, Williams did not object to Officer Bateman's testimony

identifying him as the driver. (See 7/25/13 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 12-25, p. 17, Ls. 7-25.)
Nor did Williams move to suppress Officer Bateman's testimony.

On appeal,

Williams has failed to show the admission of Officer Bateman's testimony was
fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." lg.
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." lg. (citing Losser, 145
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Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981)).
C.

Williams Does Not Challenge The District Court's Ruling That He
Abandoned The Due Process Claim On Intermediate Appeal And
Therefore The Appellate Court Should Affirm On This Unchallenged Basis
The district court held that Williams failed to pursue the due process claim

on intermediate appeal and thus abandoned it. (R., pp. 141-142.)
Mr. Williams did not object to [Officer Bateman's identification]
testimony on the basis that it was unreliable and, therefore, violated
his due process rights in having it introduced. See State v. Lenon,
143 Idaho 415, 417, 146 P.3d 681, 683 (Ct. App. 2006) ("In
general, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives
that issues for purposes of appeal. However, in the case of
fundamental error, we may consider the issue even though no
objection was made at time of trial. .. ")
Mr. Williams has neither acknowledged that this issue was not
raised before the magistrate nor argued that it constituted
fundamental error for this identification to have been admitted. See
Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010)
("The argument shall contain the [party's] contentions with respect
to the issues presented ... the reasons therefor, with citations to
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied
upon."); I.AR. 35(a)(6); City of Boise v. Bench Sewer District, 116
Idaho 25, 26 n. 1, 773 P.2d 642, 643 n. 1 (1988) (issue not fully
briefed or argued is deemed abandoned).
(Id.)

On appeal to this Court, Williams does not challenge this ruling.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 2-8.)

Instead, Williams jumps straight to an argument

regarding the merits of his due process claim. (Id.) When the basis for a trial
court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, an appellate court will affirm on the
unchallenged basis. See State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d
1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). Here, Williams does not challenge the district
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court's determination that he abandoned his due process claim and the district
court's ruling on the due process claims should be affirmed on this basis.
D.

Even If This Court Considers Williams Due Process Claim, It Fails
Because Williams Did Not Assert A Due Process Violation At Trial And He
Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error On Appeal
At trial, Williams did not move to suppress or object to Officer Bateman's

testimony identifying him as the driver of 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta. It is wellsettled that "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for
appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d
125, 129 (1995)). An exception to this rule exists if the alleged error constitutes
fundamental error.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.

However, the

burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the defendant
asserting the error for the first time on appeal. Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. To
carry that burden, a defendant asserting an unpreserved error must demonstrate
that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id.
1.

Williams' Constitutional Rights Were Not Implicated When Officer
Bateman Compared A Photograph Of Williams To Williams' Face
While Williams Was Committing The Crime

Williams fails the first prong of the fundamental error test because Officer
Bateman did not violate or even implicate Williams' constitutional due process
rights by comparing Williams' face to a photograph of Williams during the
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commission of the crime. "[T]he due process test for suppression of an in-court
identification that is allegedly tainted by an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court
identification is whether the out-of-court identification was so suggestive that
there is a very substantial likelihood of misidentification." State v. Hoisington, 104
Idaho 153, 161, 657 P.2d 17, 25 (1983) (citing State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87,
103,577 P.2d 1135, 1151 (1978)). Idaho uses a two stage inquiry to determine
whether an out-of-court identification violates due process. See State v. Alger,
115 Idaho 42, 44-45, 764 P.2d 119, 121-122 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1988). To suppress
an

in-court identification the appellant must show that the out-of-court

identification was obtained "as a result of confrontations 'so unnecessarily
suggestive' that they are 'conducive to irreparable mistaken identification."' Id.,
at 44,764 P.2d at 121 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967)). Evidence of the out-of-court identification
is suppressed under the same standard, save the mistaken identification is not
irreparable. Alger, 115 Idaho at 44, 764 P.2d at 121. Second, the Idaho Courts
will look at whether, under the totality of the circumstances, an identification was
reliable even though the identification procedure was suggestive. kl,., at 45, 764
P.2d at 122 n. 2.
First, Williams failed to show that his due process rights are even
implicated by Officer Bateman's conduct. This case is significantly different than
the identification cases cited by Williams. See Appellant's brief, pp. 3-6 (citing
Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 657 P.2d 17; State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 301
P.3d 242 (2013)).

Unlike the cases cited by Williams, there was no
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"confrontation." Officer Bateman did not take a photograph of Williams to a third
person or prepare a photo lineup for a third party witness at some point after the
Officer Bateman compared Williams' face to the photo on his computer

crim.

while the crime was ongoing. This is no different than a police officer identifying
a suspect based upon a driver's license photograph or a booking photo. See

~

State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 88 P.3d 1226 (Ct. App. 2004) (officer
compared face of suspect to face on driver's license photograph to identify
suspect); State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 730-731, 24 P.3d 44, 47-47 (2001)
(deputy used booking photo to positively identify suspect). Williams' appeal fails
to implicate any due process rights. This is not a tainted lineup presented to a
witness after a crime, but is an officer identifying the suspect during the
commission of the crime.
Williams fails to cite a single case where an officer's comparison of a
suspect to a photograph, during the commission of the crime is suggestive, much
less implicates the suspect's due process rights.

Because Williams is not

seeking to suppress a subsequent identification by a third party, but is instead
seeking to exclude what Officer Bateman observed as an eye-witness to the
crime, Williams has failed to show his due process rights were even implicated,
let alone violated by a impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification.
Second, under the totality of the circumstance the identification was
reliable.

"Factors to be considered under the totality of circumstances test in

determining whether an identification is reliable include (1) the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of
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attention, (3) the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated at the identification, and (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification." Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162, 657 P.2d at 26
(citing Manson v. Brathwaite. 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977),
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)).

The

application of these factors highlight the reliability of Officer Bateman's
identification.
Officer Bateman had a good opportunity to view Williams at the time of the
crime. Officer Bateman drove next to the 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta until he
was able to confirm Williams was the driver. (7 /25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 12, L.
9.) Officer Bateman had a clear view of Williams. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-18.)
Officer Bateman's passenger window was down and William's driver's side
window was clear.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 19, L. 12 - p. 20, L. 13.)

It took Officer

Bateman roughly six to seven seconds to confirm that the driver of the gray 2004
Volkswagen Jetta was Williams. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 12 - p. 12, L. 9.) Only
after Officer Bateman confirmed Williams' identification did Officer Bateman
attempt to make a traffic stop.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 13 Ls. 6-17.)

There was no

evidence that Officer Bateman needed additional time to identify Williams.
Officer Bateman had a very high degree of attention.

Officer Bateman

was specifically looking at Williams and comparing him with the picture on
dashboard computer. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 21-24.) Officer Bateman testified
that he was "primarily looking to see who the person driving the vehicle was.
That was my main reason to be beside this car." (Id.)
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The third factor also weighs in the State's favor because Officer Bateman
did not identify Williams by looking at a picture or seeing a person that matched
the perpetrator's description. Rather, he made a comparison of Williams' face to
the photograph of Williams while Williams was committing the crime. Because
no prior description played any role and instead it was a simultaneous
identification it was highly reliable.
Officer Bateman had a high level of certainty in the identification:
And your testimony is that you're sure that Mr. Williams is
the guy that you saw on that day?
Q.

A.
If I wasn't 100 percent sure I would have never thought
about trying to stop the vehicle, let alone write a citation for it.
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-15.)
Finally, there was also no time between the crime and the identification.
The identification was contemporaneous with the crime. Considering the totality
of the circumstances and the five factors, the identification was reliable.
2.

The Error Did Not Plainly Exist

Williams fails to meet his burden of showing that the error plainly exists
without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
Williams' trial counsel did not object or seek to suppress Officer
Bateman's testimony identifying Williams as the driver. (See 7/25/13 Tr., p. 12,
Ls. 12-25, p. 17, Ls. 10-25.)

Instead, Williams' trial counsel cross examined

Officer Bateman regarding the accuracy of his identification. (See 7/25/13 Tr., p.
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19, L. 6 - 24, L. 16.) Williams' trial counsel asked whether Officer Bateman's
view was obstructed, whether Officer Bateman remembered the driver's clothes,
the length of time Officer Bateman had to view the driver, whether Officer
Bateman's attention was divided, and whether Officer Bateman could remember
this incident among the hundreds of traffic stops he conducted. (Id.) Williams'
trial counsel made the tactical decision not to object or move to suppress Officer
Bateman's testimony and to instead attack Officer Bateman's identification on
cross examination.
Williams also fails to show that the error was legally "plain." Williams does
not cite to a single case where a police officer identifying the suspect during the
commission of the crime constituted a due process violation.

It was not plain

error to permit Officer Bateman to testify regarding the identification of Williams.
Williams has failed to show fundamental error and the district court and
jury verdict are properly affirmed. 1

11.
Williams Has Failed To Show The Evidence Was Not Sufficient To Support His
Conviction For Driving Without Privileges
A.

Introduction
On appeal Williams argues there was no substantial competent evidence

establishing Williams was the driver and Williams knew his license was
suspended. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) Williams' arguments fail.

Williams has also failed to show prejudice because he has failed to show Officer
Bateman's testimony regarding his identification of Williams as the driver of the
2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta violated his due process rights.
1
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There was substantial competent evidence to support the jury finding that
Williams was the driver of the 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta because Officer
Bateman positively identified Williams and the 2004 gray Volkswagen Jetta is
registered to Williams.
There was also substantial competent evidence to support the jury finding
that Williams knew or reasonably should have known his driver's license was
suspended on February 15, 2013 because Williams admitted he knew his license
suspension went into effect on December 14, 2012 and his conduct and
testimony provide the reasonable inference that he knew it was still suspended
on February 15, 2013.
B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

State v. Knutson, 121

Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at
1072.

Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are

construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho

14

698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d
at 1072.

C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove Williams Was The
Driver of the 2004 Gray Volkswagen Jetta
The state presented substantial evidence that Williams was the driver of

the 2004 Gray Volkswagen Jetta. Officer Bateman testified that he had a clear
view of the driver.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-18.)

The driver of the 2004

Volkswagen looked at Officer Bateman. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 11, L. 19-p. 12, L. 9.)
Officer Bateman testified that drove next to the 2004 Volkswagen until he was
able to confirm that Williams was the driver. (Id.; see also 7/25/13 Tr., p. 13, L.
6-13.) Officer Bateman testified he was 100 percent sure that Williams was the
driver.

(7/25/13 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-15.)

The state introduced evidence that

Williams was the owner of 2004 Gray Volkswagen Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 6, L. 19
- p. 10, L. 20; Ex. 1.) Williams confirmed that he was the owner of a gray 2004
Volkswagen Jetta. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 19-21.) Williams did not provide any
testimony who else was driving his car on February 15, 2013.

There are

substantial facts and the inferences drawn from those facts to support the jury
finding Williams was the driver.
D.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Prove Williams Knew Or
Should Have Known His License Was Suspended
The jury found that Williams knew or should have known his license was

suspended when Officer Bateman saw him driving. Williams argues there was
no substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found that
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Williams knew his license was suspended on February 15, 2013. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 11 13.)
The jury instruction explained how a jury can find a defendant knew their
driving privileges are revoked, disqualified or suspended. (R., p. 61.)
A person has knowledge that the person's license, driving privileges
or permit to drive is revoked, disqualified or suspended when:
(a) the person has actual knowledge of the revocation,
disqualification or suspension of the person's license, driving
privileges or permit to drive; or
(b) the person has received oral or written notice from a verified,
authorized source that the person's license, driving privileges or
permit to drive was revoked, disqualified or suspended; or
(c) Notice of the suspension, disqualification or revocation of his
license, driving privileges or permit to drive was mailed by first class
mail to his address pursuant to section 49-320, Idaho Code, as
shown in the transportation department records, and he failed to
receive the notice or learn of its contents as a result of his own
unreasonable, intentional or negligent conduct or his failure to keep
the transportation department apprised of his mailing address as
required by section 49-320, Idaho Code; or
(d) the person has knowledge of, or a reasonable person in the
person's situation exercising reasonable diligence would have
knowledge of, the existence of facts or circumstances which, under
Idaho law, might have caused the revocation, disqualification or
suspension of the person's license, driving privileges or permit to
drive.
(R., p. 61; see also I.C. § 18-8001(2).) The state provided evidence that Williams
had knowledge of his license suspension.

Williams testified that he knew his

license suspension went into effect on December 14, 2012. (7/25/13 Tr., p., 34,
Ls. 22-25.)

Ms. O'Neil, a records keeper for the Idaho Transportation

Department, testified that Williams' license was suspended on February 15,
2013. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 25, L. 15 - p. 26, L. 24.) At no point did Williams testify
16

that he believed he had driving privileges on the day in question. (7/25/13 Tr., p.
30, L. 9 - p. 35, L. 19.) Officer Bateman testified that Williams told the officer he
knew his license was suspended but that "He thought it had been taken care of."
(7/25/13 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 12-17.) Williams testified he had not been driving to
school, but had been "catching taxis and having friends drop me off." (7/25/13
Tr., p. 32, Ls. 3-24.) Williams' driving behavior also supports the jury verdict that
Williams knew his license was suspended. When Officer Bateman saw Williams
driving, Williams was "continually looking in the rearview mirror, glancing, very
rigid, ten and two posture." (7/25/13 Tr. p. 6, Ls. 11-18.) Williams also took
action to avoid being pulled over by Officer Bateman. (7/25/13 Tr., p. 13, L. 6 14, L. 6.)
When I began to do that I put my [back] flashers on to warn
traffic behind me that I was going to be slowing down so I didn't get
rear-ended. Didn't cause a traffic accident or anything like that.
When I did that cars behind me, obviously, started slowing down. I
got all the way down to about 20 miles-an-hour and Mr. Williams
also slowed down right with me.
It was obvious to me he didn't want me to get behind him.
Wouldn't look over at me. I could see out of the corner of his eye,
kind of, looking to see the position of my vehicle was. Without
stopping in the roadway I wasn't going to be able to get behind his
car.
(Tr., p. 13, L. 6 - 14, L. 6.) The jury could reasonable infer from the evidence
presented that Williams knew his driving privileges were suspended and did not
actually or reasonably believe they had been reinstated.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Williams' conviction of
misdemeanor Driving Without Privileges.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2014.
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